The August 29th U-2 Mission

A CIA U-2 mission ends the three-week gap in photographic intelligence on Cuba.

Fiftieth Chapter in a Series Chronicling the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

50 Years Ago Today: a News Conference and a U-2 Mission

On Wednesday, August 29, 1962, exactly 50 years ago today, John F. Kennedy held a news conference.

When a reporter asked about Cuba, the President said that

a)     the United States had no evidence that Soviet troops had arrived in Cuba;

b)    the United States had no evidence that antiaircraft missiles had arrived in Cuba; and

c)     he did not intend to invade Cuba “at this time.”

That same day a CIA U-2 took off to photograph Cuba for the first time in three weeks. During the flight, Mission 3088’s cameras recorded the information about antiaircraft missiles the President said his administration had not yet received.

The August 29th Photographs

As the declassified CIA map at the head of this chapter shows, Mission 3088 covered the entire island of Cuba.

The photographs from Mission 3088 were interpreted at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) near Washington on Thursday, the 30th. Dino Brugioni, who worked at NPIC during this period, says that shortly after analysts began to examine the developed film, one of them shouted, “I’ve got a SAM [surface-to-air-missile] site!” By the end of the day’s work, analysts had discovered eight SAM sites under construction in northwestern Cuba.

One of those sites appears in the third photograph attached to this chapter. The distinctive “Star of David” pattern of SAM sites photographed so many times before in the Soviet Union was unmistakable. The Soviets had been busy during the August photo gap.

Brugioni says that these pictures also showed that the “FRUIT SET” fire control radar had been deployed at some of these sites. The FRUIT SET would guide the SA-2 to its target. He adds that HUMINT (human intelligence) concerning the eight SAM site areas had already reported “tents, construction activity, military vehicles, and land expropriation. Many of these reports also had revealed the presence of Soviets at the sites.…”

At long last, therefore, Mission 3088’s photographs had verified the HUMINT which the U.S. intelligence community had been receiving from agents, refugees, and defectors. Contrary to their recent denials, the Soviets were bringing military equipment to Cuba.

The Implications of the SA-2s in Cuba

The SA-2 was solely a defensive weapon. It was intended to guard ground installations against enemy air attacks. It could be used only against aircraft flying above 3,000 feet.

The only American aircraft currently flying above Cuba was the U-2, pictured at the head of this chapter. The U-2 was armed only with cameras. It was harmless—unless it photographed something the Soviets wanted to hide. The SA-2s must have been sent to Cuba, therefore,

a)     to discourage or shoot down U-2 flights over installations the Soviets wanted to hide; or

b)    to defend installations against high-altitude attacks should the United States invade.

No one except Director of Central Intelligence John McCone had asked or would ask what those installations might be.

McCone’ theory, which he had first stated on August 10th: the Soviets intended to establish strategic bases in Cuba whose nuclear missiles would be capable of reaching the United States. McCone believed that the SA-2s were being installed to protect those missile sites when they became operational.

But none of the other high-level policy makers believed him, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy.

One fact the Kennedy administration could never forget, however, including Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy: a Soviet SA-2 had shot down a U.S. U-2 over Russia on May 1, 1960.

President Kennedy was shown the new photographs on August 31.


Email your questions to phufstader@sbcglobal.net or post a comment.

Sources and Notes

Details of Mission 3088 come from Norman Polmar and John D. Gresham, DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2006, 77. This page also confirms the three month gap in U-2 missions “because of bad weather.” Strictly speaking, however, it would have been bad weather forecasts that delayed the missions.

The “Transcript of the President’s News Conference on Domestic and Foreign Matters” was printed on p. 10 of the August 30, 1962, issue of the New York Times.

Dino Brugioni’s discussion of the significance of the August 29 U-2 photographs begins on p. 104 of his Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of The Cuban Missile Crisis (Robert F. McCort, ed.). New York: Random House, 1991.

The CIA map at the head of this chapter is Document 1 in Mary McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Washington, D.C.: October 1992.

The pictures of the U-2 and the SAM site come from the Dino A. Brugioni Collection, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/photos.htm.

This post is contributed by a community member. The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Patch Media Corporation. Everyone is welcome to submit a post to Patch. If you'd like to post a blog, go here to get started.

M.L. August 31, 2012 at 12:01 AM
As a military kid living outside Paris France (when France was an ally...) during this period, we were all well aware of what was happening with Russia ; while the US was watching it's southeast shores, we were watching Berlin and the eastern bloc countries for the threatened attack from the east, which thankfully never materialized. What's hard to imagine is that this was all taking place less than 20 years after WW2 had ended in that area and lots of folks remembered the blitzkrieg attacks by the Germans that had occurred during their lifetimes...
Peter Hufstader August 31, 2012 at 12:22 AM
Thanks for your thoughtful response, M.L. (Were you in France during the Lauris Norstad period?) I believe that everyone today, like you in the early '60s, would agree that Berlin was the key, crucial element in the Cold War throughout its entire life. Berlin was certainly a huge factor in Khrushchev's April 1962 plunge into what became the Cuba Missile Crisis (our term). He had to get the hated Western Allies out of their Berlin sectors, and this leverage might just do it. Or else an unfriendly coalition in the Presidium might just start him on that short walk down the corridor in the Lubyanka.


More »
Got a question? Something on your mind? Talk to your community, directly.
Note Article
Just a short thought to get the word out quickly about anything in your neighborhood.
Share something with your neighbors.What's on your mind?What's on your mind?Make an announcement, speak your mind, or sell somethingPost something
See more »